Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a needs-based program for the elderly and disabled, paid to people who meet certain economic requirements. Individuals, in 2019, can receive a maximum monthly SSI benefit of $771, but a married couple can only receive a maximum of $1,157 combined per month even if both of them meet the medical requirements for SSI.
The monthly amount for a married couple has always been less than that of two individuals living in the same household who are not married, but why does Social Security penalize a married couple and provide about 25 percent less in benefits?
This topic has been a matter of consideration for a long time. Social Security offered an issue paper examining the program as it relates to married couples and possible adjustments to the program. Below are some of the highlights of the paper.
Summary
The treatment of marriage is a frequent consideration in the discussion of government benefit policies. In the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, for example, two recipients married to each other receive a benefit that is one-quarter less than if they simply lived together but not as husband and wife. The treatment of marriage has been an issue in other means-tested programs as well. For example, legislation passed in 2001 reduced the marriage penalties identified with the earned income tax credit (EITC), an income supplement for low-income workers. Within that context, this paper examines SSI policy toward marital status.
Although each member of an SSI married couple is guaranteed an income level equal to only 75 percent of the federal benefit rate, they are generally financially better off than SSI individuals living alone. This comparison reflects the economies of scale from sharing living expenses as well as higher incomes. However, members of the opposite sex who cohabitate and do not marry (or are not found to be representing themselves as husband and wife) are each guaranteed an income level equal to 100 percent of the federal benefit rate and generally fare better financially than SSI married couples.
This paper identifies how marital status affects benefits and provides options for making the program more neutral toward marital status. The options include changes to three aspects of the SSI program: the benefit rate, income and resource exclusions, and counting spousal income and resources.
Conclusion
The higher poverty rate for households consisting of a married couple who are both receiving SSI (45.1 percent) compared with those consisting of two non-married recipients (9.8 percent) raises a question of benefit equity. The economies-of-scale argument would seem to apply to both types of households and would not seem to give members of either household an advantage in terms of reduced costs for food and shelter or other necessities of daily living. Steuerle (2001, 2) discusses the shortcomings of using economies of scale as a rationale for justifying marriage penalties:
The problem with using this argument to justify marriage penalties is not that there are no economies of scale from sharing. There are, and indeed, these gains reinforce other natural instincts to engage in mutual support. Economies of scale, however, apply to almost all sharing arrangements—dormitories, retirement homes, cohabitation, and so on. Yet marital vows of allegiance are the only type of arrangement that is taxed.
In addressing the way that married couples are treated in the SSI program, policymakers face two approaches. One is to treat eligible couples like individual recipients. This approach would extend the individual federal benefit rate and income and resource exclusions to each member of the couple, thus raising program costs. The other approach is to extend the argument used to justify paying couples a lower rate to all recipients who enjoy economies of scale by sharing household expenses, lowering benefits for many recipients. This approach may result in a savings or cost depending on the rate of reduction and whether other income and resource changes are included.
